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Brief of Appellant 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The State appeals from a pretrial dismissal of an information charging illegal 
possession of a controlled substance in a drug-free zone and possession of drug 
paraphernalia in a drug-free zone. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code 
Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West 2008). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the preliminary hearing magistrate erroneously conclude that the 
probation agent's testimony — that police officers assisting him in a probation search 
told him that the baggie they showed him was found inside a carburetor next to 
Defendant's bed —was inadmissible under rule 1102, Utah Rules of Evidence, 
because the agent did not identify which officer made the statement or discovered 
the baggie? 
Standard of Review. Interpretation of an evidentiary rule is a legal 
determination that is reviewed for correctness, without deference to the lower 
court's interpretation. See State v. Rhinehart, 2006 UT App 517, | 8, 153 P.3d 830; 
State v. Bujan, 2006 UT App 322, If 14,142 P.3d 581, affd, 2008 UT 47,190 P.3d 1255; 
State v. Webster, 2001 UT App 238, ^ 10, 32 P.3d 976. See also State v. Graham, 2006 
UT 43, If 16 n. 7,143 P.2d 268 (statutory interpretation). 
Preservation. The magistrate rejected the prosecutor's argument that the 
hearsay statement was reliable and admissible under rule 1102, UTAH RULES OF 
EVIDENCE (R40:16-17; R. 27-19 & 34-31). 
2. Did the trial court erroneously conclude that the probation officer's other 
testimony was insufficient to bind over on drug possession? 
Standard of Review. A magistrate's refusal to bind over is a legal determination 
that is reviewed for correctness, with "limited deference" accorded the magistrate's 
decision. See State v. Johnson, 2007 UT App 392, f^ 5, 174 P.3d 654 (citing State v. 
Virgin, 2006 UT 29, | 34,137 P.3d 787). 
Preservation. The magistrate rejected the prosecutor's argument that the 
evidence was sufficient for bindover (R40:16-17; R. 27-19 & 34-31). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following constitutional provision and rules are attached in Addendum A: 
2 
UTAH CONST, art 1 § 12 - Rights of Accused Persons; 
UTAH R. CRIM. P. 7 - Proceedings Before Magistrate; 
UTAH R. EVID. 1102 - Reliable Hearsay in Criminal Preliminary Examinations. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In July 2008, Defendant was charged with illegal possession of a controlled 
substance (methamphetamine), a third degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (West Supp. 2008), and possession of drug paraphernalia, a 
class B misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37a-5(l) (West Supp. 
2008) (R. 3-1). The charges were subsequently amended to a second-degree felony 
and a class A misdemeanor, respectively, pursuant to section 58-37-8(4) 
(enhancement for drug offense committed in drug-free zone) (R. 18; R40: 2). 
A preliminary hearing on the amended information was conducted (R. 18; 
R40:2). Adult Probation and Parole Agent Kirt Robinson testified that he directed a 
probation search of a small shed Defendant used as his residence (R40:3-15). Police 
Officers Wolcott and Barker assisted Agent Robinson, as did a canine officer and 
dog (R40: 4 & 6). The agent explained that during the search, he stood with 
Defendant just outside the shed's front door because the shed was small and 
cluttered (R40: 7-8 & 10-12). The agent testified that Officer Wolcott found drug 
paraphernalia and a small baggie above Defendant's bed (R40: 7-8). The agent 
testified that Officers Wolcott and Barker then searched further and dismantled a 
carburetor next to the bed and found a large baggie (R40: 8-15). The agent observed 
3 
the items immediately after they were discovered and watched Officer Barker field-
test the contents of both baggies (R40: 8-13). The field tests confirmed that the small 
baggie contained methamphetamine residue and the large baggie contained 
methamphetamine crystal (id.). Defense counsel did not object during the agent's 
testimony. 
After the prosecution rested, defense counsel argued that the evidence was 
insufficient without Officers Wolcott7s and Barker's testimony because Agent 
Robinson was "not actually present um - when the items were actually located in 
the shed/ ' even though the agent saw the drugs being field-tested (R40:15-16). The 
prosecutor disagreed. She asserted the testimony established probable cause to 
support a bindover, especially where the testifying agent was "present . . . just 
outside the door, had seen the location, had seen everything that was involved in it, 
and was involved with running the whole search, and was advised by other officers 
what had been found in areas that he had seen himself as well" and the agent was 
the "officer who made the decision about why and when to make this search" (R40: 
16). The prosecutor offered, nevertheless, to move to continue the hearing and 
subpoena the officers, if the defense wanted their testimony (id.). 
The magistrate concluded that the hearsay statement regarding Officer's 
Wolcott discovery of the paraphernalia and small baggie of residue was reliable, 
admissible, and supported possession of paraphernalia in a drug free zone (R40:16-
4 
17). The magistrate ruled, however, that the agent's testimony concerning the large 
baggie was insufficient to bind over on possession of a controlled substance in a 
drug free zone: 
I'm not going to move the prelim. That was a bad choice, counsel. You 
know, probable cause can be established on hearsay. And I was 
stretching it at the last hearing. But this one — all I've got is the officer's 
received report from someone who said that someone was buying from 
the defendant. He went to the location, didn't find anything himself. 
He stepped outside, and then I have a report that an officer found some 
drugs. I don't have any direct testimony that the drugs were located. 
U r n - this one falls short. Um —I'm going to find that you failed to 
meet your burden of proof now. I understand the — the burden for re-
filing. . . . Whether or not you legitimately or reasonably 
underestimated the proof that would be necessary for today is not 
before me. But you didn't meet your burden. So [the information] is 
dismissed. 
(R40:16-17). See Addendum C (Transcript of Preliminary Hearing). 
The prosecutor moved for reconsideration and for permission to re-file the 
information (R. 27-19). The defense filed no response. The magistrate 
acknowledged that under rule 1102(b)(6), Utah Rules of Evidence, a non-testifying 
officer's statement to a testifying officer is deemed reliable and admissible at 
preliminary hearing, but still refused to modify his prior decision: 
In this case, however, Officer Robertson [sic] didn't specifically recite 
any statements of a non-testifying officer about the large baggie in the 
carburetor. While the testimony was specific about Officer Watcott 
[sic] reaching into the tear in the overhead tarp, the small baggie and 
syringe, by themselves, contained insufficient quantities to establish a 
felony charge. Officer Robertson [sic] was unable to state who 
searched the carburetor or who found the large baggie of suspected 
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drugs. The view of the Court at the time of the preliminary hearing, 
and now, is that this evidence was a step removed from hearsay and 
that the Court was asked to simply assume from the circumstances that 
some officer found the substance in a location that connected it to the 
Defendant. 
(R. 33-32) (emphasis in original). See Addendum B (Ruling & Order). The magistrate 
did not address the prosecutor's request to re-file (id.). 
On November 6, 2008, the magistrate entered a final order dismissing the 
information in its entirety (R. 36) (Add. B).1 On November 10,2008, the State timely 
appealed (R. 38). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant was on probation and under the supervision of Adult Probation 
and Parole Agent Kirt Robinson (R40: 3). Local law enforcement officers informed 
Agent Robinson that individuals they had arrested had named Defendant as their 
drug source (R40:3-4). Robinson decided to immediately contact Defendant about 
the allegation (R40: 4). Because the agent intended to visit Defendant late at night, 
he asked Provo City Police Officers Wolcott and Barker, who had worked closely 
with the agent on other occasions, to accompany him (id.). 
Given the magistrate's refusal to bind over the felony charge, it was 
appropriate to also dismiss the misdemeanor charge that arose out of the same 
criminal episode. See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-1-402 & -403 (potentially barring 
separate prosecutions for charges arising out of single criminal episode). 
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Agent Robinson and the two police officers arrived at Defendant's residence 
at 1:00 a.m. on July 12, 2008 (R40: 3 & 4). The residence was "[a] shed, actually, 
adjacent to his mother's mobile home" (R40: 4). Robinson knocked and Defendant 
came to the door (id.). Robinson told Defendant why he was there and asked to 
come in; Defendant said "sure" (R40: 5). 
When Agent Robinson and Officer Barker entered, they found only Defendant 
inside (id.). Defendant denied selling methamphetamine (id.). Agent Robinson 
searched Defendant and a couch, but found no drugs (id.). 
The interior of the shed was "extremely cluttered" (R40:6). Robinson testified 
that there were "probably hundreds of small nooks and crannies, engine pa r t s , . . . 
small containers, . . . I can't - I can't even go and - name all the places that are 
possible to hide small amounts of anything" (id.). The agent called for a canine unit, 
a search procedure he had utilized on other occasions (id.). 
Utah County Sheriff's Deputy Nielsen arrived with a search dog (R40: 6). 
Deputy Nielsen asked Agent Robinson and Defendant to step outside because the 
shed was so "small, cramped" (R40: 7). Robinson and Defendant stood outside 
while Deputy Nielsen conducted a canine sweep (id.). Deputy Nielsen told the 
agent that the dog alerted around Defendant's bed and "another search was 
conducted in the bed area down low," but nothing was found (id.). Deputy Nielsen 
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then conducted a second canine sweep and told Agent Robinson, who was still 
standing outside, that the dog had alerted on the ceiling area over the bed (R40: 7-8). 
At the preliminary hearing, the prosecutor asked Agent Robinson what he did 
after the second canine sweep (R40: 8). Agent Robinson responded that Officer 
Wolcott found paraphernalia and a small baggie with residue in a ceiling tarp and 
that the officers also discovered a large baggie of drugs in a carburetor next to 
Defendant's bed: 
Urn-another — another search was conducted in that area. Officer 
Barker and Officer Wolcott—um — searched — um — basically the top of 
the shed is covered in a tarp and all kinds of hanging material and 
small objects. Um —there was a slit visible in the tarp. Um —Officer 
Wolcott reached up through the slit and retrieved a syringe, a small 
baggie with crystalline residue in its, and digital scales. Um -there — 
there was also an engine part, a carburetor actually laying [sic] right 
next to the bed. Um —the carburetor was taken apart, and inside, a 
piece of the carburetor was another baggie, a pink, reddish colored 
baggie. Um — it also had a crystalline substance in it It appeared to 
be methamphetamine. 
(R40: 8). Robinson clarified that he was not inside the shed when the drugs were 
discovered, but was "standing right outside the entrance" (R40: 11-12). He 
explained that after the search, the officers told him that they had dismantled the 
carburetor and told him what they had found (R40:14). He further explained that 
when he was initially inside the shed, he had seen the carburetor next to 
Defendant's bed (R40:13). The agent testified that when the officers exited the shed, 
the agent saw all the items seized (R40: 8 & 12-13). 
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Agent Robinson, who was familiar with drug field-testing, observed Officer 
Barker field-test the contents of both baggies and confirmed that both tested positive 
for methamphetamine (R40: 8-9).2 The shed was in a drug free zone (R40: 9). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Rule 1102 (b)(6), Utah Rules of Evidence, directs that a non-testifying law 
enforcement officer's statement to a testifying officer is reliable and admissible to 
establish probable cause to bind over. The rule embodies the widely recognized 
"fellow officer" or "collective knowledge" doctrine that presumes officer-to-officer 
communications are reliable and permits probable cause to be based on the officers' 
collective knowledge. Contrary to the magistrate's ruling, neither the rule nor the 
doctrine require the testifying officer to witness the described search or to precisely 
identify who did or said what in the course of the collective search. In sum, the 
magistrate erred in his interpretation of rule 1102(b)(6). 
Moreover, the facts here establish the reliability and admissibility of the 
hearsay statement under other subsections of the same rule. The precise location of 
the large baggie and which officer discovered it are, at most, foundational facts, 
which may established by hearsay pursuant to subsection (b)(3) of rule 1102. 
2
 There was sufficient residue in the small baggie to test, but not to charge 
possession (R.40: 8-9; R. 32). Instead, the residue supported that the scales and 
syringe were drug paraphernalia. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37a-3 (West Supp. 
2008) (drug paraphernalia defined). The large baggie of methamphetamine found in 
the carburetor was the basis of the felony possession charge (R. 32). 
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Similarly, the non-testifying officers7 account of the discovery may constitute a 
"present sense impression/7 a traditional hearsay exception, rendering the statement 
admissible under subsection (b)(1) of the rule. Or, under these facts, the hearsay 
statement has "similar indicia of reliability77 and is, therefore, admissible under 
subsection (b)(9) of rule 1102. That the hearsay at issue is defined as reliable under 
at least three other subsections of the rule further negates the magistrate's 
conclusion that the hearsay was unreliable and, therefore, could not be credited. 
The magistrate also erred in concluding that without the hearsay statement, 
Agent Robinson's remaining testimony was insufficient to establish probable cause 
to bind over on felony drug possession. Even if the hearsay is discarded, probable 
cause existed based on the agent's eyewitness testimony that Defendant lived in the 
shed and was its only occupant and that officers exited the shed holding a baggie of 
methamphetamine. The precise location of that baggie within the shed is not critical 
to probable cause. 
In sum, this Court should reverse the magistrate's refusal to bind over and 




THE MAGISTRATE ERRED IN HIS INTERPRETATION OF 
UTAH R. EVID. 1102, THE RELIABLE HEARSAY RULE 
The magistrate ruled the hearsay statement concerning the small baggie and 
paraphernalia was admissible because Agent Robinson identified Officer Wolcott as 
the officer who found these items (R. 33-32). The magistrate ruled the hearsay 
statements concerning the discovery of the large baggie were unreliable and 
inadmissible because the agent did not identify which officer discovered the baggie 
or informed the agent of the discovery (R40: 16-17; R. 33-31). The ruling was 
erroneous. Under rule 1102, UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE, both hearsay statements 
were reliable and both were admissible at preliminary hearing. 
It is well established that probable cause to support a criminal charge may be 
based on hearsay, in whole or in part. See Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359,363-
64 (1956) (hearsay permissible basis for grand jury indictment); State v. Pledger, 896 
P.2d 1226, 1228 n.4 (Utah 1995) (under federal constitution, hearsay permissible 
basis for criminal information and bindover). See also UTAH CONST, art. 1, § 12 
(under state constitution, reliable hearsay permissible basis for criminal information 
and bindover); UTAH R. CRIM. 7(i)(2) (hearsay "in whole or in part" permissible 
basis for bindover) (Add. A). Accord State v. Rhinehart, 2006 UT App 517, ^ 13-15, 
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153 P.3d 830 (under federal and state constitutions, right of confrontation is trial 
right, not pretrial right). 
Consistent with this authority, rule 1102(a), UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE, directs 
that "[r]eliable hearsay is admissible at criminal preliminary examinations/7 The 
rule defines "reliable hearsay" to include, in pertinent part: 
(1) hearsay evidence admissible at trial under the Utah Rules of 
Evidence; . . . 
(3) evidence establishing the foundation for or the authenticity of any 
exhibit;. . . 
(6) a statement of a non-testifying peace officer to a testifying peace 
officer;... 
(9) other hearsay evidence with similar indicia of reliability, regardless 
of admissibility at trial under Rules 803 and 804 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence. 
See UTAH R. EVID. 1102(b) (1), (3), (6) & (9) (Add. A). In this case, the magistrate 
specifically acknowledged rule 1102(b)(6), but did not correctly interpret or apply it. 
See Add. B (Ruling). 
The Advisory Committee Note to rule 1102 states that subsection (b)(6) "is 
similar to the 'fellow officer' rule applicable to search or arrest warrant affidavits/' 
See Add. A. See also Burns v. Boyden, 2006 UT 14, Tj 18 n.6,133 P.3d 370 (advisory 
committee notes "merit great weight" in interpreting evidentiary rules). The 
"fellow officer" rule, also known as the "collective knowledge" doctrine, was 
established decades before adoption of rule 1102. See United States v. Veniresca, 380 
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U.S. 102, 107408, 110-111 (1965) (officers7 collective knowledge sufficient to 
establish probable cause for search); State v. Dorsey, 731 P.2d 1085,1088 (Utah 1986) 
(officers' collective knowledge sufficient to establish probable cause for arrest)). 
The fellow officer doctrine recognizes that a probable cause determination 
requires only a low level of proof and is based on a practical, not abstract or 
technical, interpretation of facts: 
[A] finding of "probable cause" may rest upon evidence which is not 
legally competent in a criminal trial. . . . There is a large difference 
between the two things to be proved (guilt and probable cause), as well 
as between the tribunals which determine them, and therefore a like 
difference in the quanta and modes of proof required to establish them. 
Thus hearsay may be the basis [for probable cause] so long as there is a 
substantial basis for crediting the hearsay [Hjearsay information.. 
. need not reflect the direct personal observations of [the officer 
swearing to the information] so long as the magistrate is informed of 
some of the underlying circumstances supporting [the officer's] 
conclusions and his belief that any [person involved in providing the 
information] whose identity need not be disclosed was credible or his 
information reliable. 
Ventresca, 380 U.S. at 107-08 (citations and quotation marks omitted). See Dorsey, 731 
P.2d at 1088 (police officers "entitled to rely on . . . [observations of fellow officers 
. . . engaged in a common investigation" to establish probable cause). Indeed, under 
the fellow officer doctrine, the swearing officer may rely not only on hearsay 
statements of a fellow officer, but also on double hearsay, that is, a fellow officer's 
recitation of another officer's observations. See State v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188, 192 
(Utah 1986) ("double hearsay between police officers is not fatal" to probable cause); 
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State v. Prows, 2007 UT App 409 , \ 13,178 P.3d 908 (reasonable suspicion need not 
be based on personal knowledge of detaining officer, but "on the totality of the 
circumstances and 'the collective knowledge of all the officers involved7"). 
The fellow officer doctrine recognizes that "there is a presumption that law 
enforcements officers will convey information to each other truthfully." Nielsen, 727 
P.3d at 192. The same presumption underlies rule 1102(b)(6)/s recognition that 
officers' out-of-court communications to each other are admissible at preliminary 
hearing because such communications are reliable. 
Here, the magistrate refused to recognize rule 1102(b)(6)'s presumption of 
reliability and admissibility. In part, this was due to the magistrate's erroneous 
belief that the rule required something more to establish the reliability of the 
statement, that is, that the rule required the agent to witness the seizures himself or 
to specifically identify the officer who made the seizures (R. 32). As discussed, 
supra, neither the language of subsection (b)(6) nor its underlying doctrine requires 
this. 
Moreover, in rejecting rule 1102(b) (6)'s presumption of reliability, the 
magistrate misconstrued the facts. The magistrate found that Agent Robinson "was 
unable to state who searched the carburetor or who found the larger baggie of 
suspected drugs" (R. 32). The agent, however, was never asked to identify which 
officer found the baggie or told him of the discovery. During direct examination, 
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the agent testified that Officers Wolcott and Barker conducted the search and found 
the large baggie, but did not distinguish between the two officers (R40: 8-9). See also 
Statement of Facts, supra. On cross-examination, the agent was not asked which 
officer discovered the large baggie or informed him of the discovery: 
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Okay. Urn - so you weren't the one who saw 
where anything was located? 
AGENT ROBINSON: Urn—no, I'm not the one who removed the items 
from the location. 
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Okay. U m -
THE COURT: That wasn't the question. Ask the question again. 
DEFENSE COUNSEL: You--you were not the one who saw where the 
items were located? 
AGENT ROBINSON: No. 
(R40:12). On re-direct, the prosecutor did not ask the agent to specify which officer 
found the large baggie: 
PROSECUTOR: Did you observe the search yourself—were you able to 
see it from where you were standing with Mr. Valdez? . . . 
AGENT ROBINSON: No. I was not. I did not observe it. 
PROSECUTOR: Okay. The officers told you what they found. 
AGENT ROBINSON: Yes 
PROSECUTOR: T h e y - did you see [the items] after they were found? 
AGENT ROBINSON: Yes. 
PROSECUTOR: And was that still at the location? 
15 
AGENT ROBINSON: Yes. 
(R40: 14-15). 
The magistrate also ignored rule 1102(b)(6)'s presumption of reliability and 
admissibility when he discredited the hearsay because it was "one step removed" 
from traditional hearsay and required the magistrate to "simply assume from the 
circumstances that some officer found the substance in a location that connected it to 
the Defendant" (R. 32) (Add. B) (emphasis in original). Again, the language of rule 
1102 does not support the magistrate's view; nor do the facts. 
Agent Robinson testified that the only place searched was the shed that 
Defendant used as a residence. The agent explained that Deputy Nielsen conducted 
the canine sweeps and that Officers Wolcott and Barker conducted the physical 
searches, immediately after the canine sweeps. See Statement of Facts, supra. The 
agent further testified that when the officers exited the shed after the searches, they 
had a small baggie of what appeared to be residue, some apparent drug 
paraphernalia, and a large baggie of what appeared to be methamphetamine crystal. 
See id. The inference to be drawn from the evidence is not what the magistrate 
suggested — that some officer found some drugs in some place connected to 
Defendant—but that Officers Wolcott and Barker, searching in concert, found the 
illegal items in Defendant's small residence during a probation search. 
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Similarly, the magistrate erred in concluding that hearsay that is "one step 
removed" from traditional hearsay exceptions is unreliable and inadmissible. As 
discussed, supra, rule 1102(b)(6) directs that officers' hearsay communications are 
reliable and admissible, even if such communications are admissible at trial. Other 
subsections of the same rule also demonstrate the fallacy of the magistrate's 
interpretation. 
Subsection (b)(1) of rule 1102 recognizes that evidence that is admissible at 
trial under traditional evidentiary rules is necessarily reliable and admissible at 
preliminary hearing. But rule 1102 also recognizes that hearsay that is "one step 
removed" from traditional rules may nevertheless be reliable and admissible at 
preliminary hearing. For example, under subsection (b)(3) of the rule, hearsay 
evidence establishing foundation is deemed reliable and admissible. Here, who 
found the large baggie and precisely where baggie was found were, at most, 
foundational facts and, thus, admissible under subsection (b)(3). As it happened, no 
foundation was needed in this preliminary hearing because the baggie was not 
introduced into evidence. Nevertheless, the hearsay statement was of no 
significance in establishing probable cause. Agent Robinson's own observation and 
description of the search established that the search dog entered and left the shed, 
two officers than entered the shed, the two officers then emerged from the shed with 
two baggies that were tested and proved to contain methamphetamine. See 
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Statement of Facts, supra. These observed facts establish probable cause to believe the 
shed contained illegal drugs. 
Similarly, under rule 1102(b)(1), the hearsay statement concerning the 
discovery of the large baggie would be reliable and admissible if it were a "present 
sense impression" under traditional hearsay rules. See UTAH R. EVID. 803(1) (out-of-
court "statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while the 
declarant was perceiving the event or condition or immediately thereafter" 
admissible "even though the declarant is available as a witness"). But even if the 
hearsay statement were "one step removed" from this traditional hearsay exception, 
subsection (b)(9) of rule 1102 would still deem the statement admissible at 
preliminary hearing if it had "similar indicia of reliability." Here, such indicia of 
reliability exist given the testifying agent's own observations of the large baggie 
after the officers emerged from the shed and the agent's personal knowledge that a 
carburetor was next to Defendant's bed. See Statement of Facts, supra. 
Though the magistrate only considered admissibility under subsection (b)(6), 
the fellow officer provision, the reliability that these other subsections accord the 
same evidence undermines the magistrate's conclusion that hearsay "one step 
removed" from traditional admission is unreliable and inadmissible. In sum, the 
magistrate erred in demanding greater reliability than rule 1102 requires for the 
admission of the hearsay statements. 
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II. 
THE MAGISTRATE ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE 
REMAINING TESTIMONY WAS INSUFFICIENT FOR 
BINDOVER 
Regardless of the admissibility of the hearsay statements, Agent Robinson's 
other testimony established probable cause to believe that Defendant possessed 
methamphetamine. Consequently, the magistrate erred in concluding that the 
evidence was insufficient for bindover on felony drug possession. 
As discussed, probable cause to support a bindover requires only that the 
prosecution present sufficient evidence to support "a reasonable belief that 
Defendant committed the crime charged. See State v. Virgin, 2006 UT 29, Tf 18,137 
P.3d 787 (citing Clark, 2001 UT 9, f 16, 20 p.3d 300). This, in turn, requires the 
magistrate to view the evidence "in a light most favorable to the prosecution,, and to 
draw all reasonable inferences "in the prosecution's favor." State v. Schroyer, 2002 
UT 26, % 10, 44 P.3d 730 (citation and quotation marks omitted). The magistrate 
"may only disregard or discredit evidence that is 'wholly lacking and incapable of 
'creating a reasonable inference regarding a portion of the prosecution's claim." 
Virgin, 2006 UT 29, | 24 (quoting State v. Talbot, 972 P.2d 435, 438 (Utah 1998)). 
Accord State v. Johnson, 2007 UT App 392, ^ 6,174 P.3d 654, cert, denied, 187 P.3d 232. 
Here, the magistrate drew but one inference — that some officer found some 
drugs in some place connected to Defendant—and concluded the inference was 
19 
insufficient to support a bindover (R. 32-31). The inference is neither reasonable nor 
drawn in favor of the information. 
Disregarding any hearsay statements, the evidence establishes that Defendant 
used the shed as his residence and was its sole occupant; Agent Robinson ordered a 
canine sweep of the shed; after the canine sweep, Officers Wolcott and Barker then 
conducted a physical search of the shed; the officers exited the shed a short time 
later with a small baggie of what appeared to be residue, a large baggie of what 
appeared to be methamphetamine crystal, and drug paraphernalia; the baggies were 
tested and confirmed to contain methamphetamine. See Statement of Facts, supra. 
The only reasonable inference to be drawn from this evidence is that one or both of 
the searching officers found methamphetamine inside Defendant's shed and that 
Defendant knowingly possessed it. The magistrate erred in not making this 
inference and in refusing to bind over. 
The magistrate's refusal to view the prosecution favorably — despite the 
evidence supporting bindover —is also evident in the magistrate's denial of a 
continuance. Rule 1102(c)(1) recognizes that a continuance of a preliminary hearing 
may be warranted if "[t]he magistrate finds the hearsay evidence admitted is not 
sufficient and additional evidence is necessary for bindover/' In this case, the 
hearsay evidence was admitted without objection and the prosecution rested. Only 
after this did the defense claim and the magistrate rule that the already admitted 
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hearsay was unreliable and, consequently, could not be considered. See Statement of 
the Case, supra. When the prosecutor realized that the magistrate was considering 
dismissal, she offered to subpoena Officers Wolcott and Barker if a continuance was 
granted. The magistrate refused, even though there had been no prior continuances 
of the hearing. The refusal was unreasonable, given the lack of a timely objection to 
the admission of the hearsay statements. Cf Barson v. E.R.Squibb & Sons, 682 P.2d 
832,837 (Utah 1984) (hearsay objection untimely when not raised during testimony). 
Indeed, if the defense —or the magistrate —had asked Agent Robinson to identify 
which officer discovered the large baggie or informed him of its discovery, the 
perceived problem would have been resolved. Instead, no objections were made or 
clarifications sought. See State v. Bujan, 2006 UT App 322, % 18,142 P.3d 581, (timely 
objection precludes a party from withholding objection to enhance chances of 
dismissal or acquittal, ajfd, 2008 UT 47,190 P.3d 1255. But even if Agent Robinson 
had specifically identified the officer, that identification would not have increased 
probable cause. For, here, the officers acted in concert in searching and no matter 
who discovered the larger baggie or who informed the agent of the discovery, the 
baggie of methamphetamine was found in Defendant's shed. That fact was all that 
was necessary for bindover on felony possession. 
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In sum, even if the hearsay statements are discarded, Agent Robinson's 
remaining testimony supports a "reasonable belief that Defendant illegally 
possessed methamphetamine. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should reverse the refusal to bind over, 
reinstate the information, and allow the case to proceed to trial. 
Respectfully submitted May 18, 2009. 
MARKL. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellant 
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Art. 1, § 12 
S e c . 12 . [Rights of accused persons] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and 
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to 
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public 
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged 
to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance 
shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance 
money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be 
compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to 
testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any 
person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the 
function of that examination is limited to determining whether probable cause 
exists unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall 
preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule in 
whole or in part at any preliminary examination to determine probable cause 
or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the defendant if 
appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule. 
Laws 1994, SJ.R. 6, § 1, adopted at election Nov. 8, 1994, eff. Jan. 1, 1995. 
RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
RULE 7. PROCEEDINGS BEFORE MAGISTRATE 
(a) When a summons is issued in lieu of a warrant of arrest, the defendant 
shall appear before the court as directed in the summons. 
(b) When any peace officer or other person makes an arrest with or without 
a warrant, the person arrested shall be taken to the nearest available magistrate 
for setting of bail. If an information has not been filed, one shall be filed 
without delay before the magistrate having jurisdiction over the offense. 
(c)(1) In order to detain any person arrested without a warrant, as soon as is 
reasonably feasible but in no event longer than 48 hours after the arrest, a 
determination shall be made as to whether there is probable cause to continue 
to detain the arrestee. The determination may be made by any magistrate, 
although if the arrestee is charged with a capital offense, the magistrate may 
not be a justice court judge. The arrestee need not be present at the probable 
cause determination. 
(c)(2) A written probable cause statement shall be presented to the magis-
trate, although the statement may be verbally communicated by telephone, 
telefaxed, or otherwise electronically transmitted to the magistrate. 
(c)(2)(A) A statement which is verbally communicated by telephone shall be 
reduced to a sworn written statement prior to submitting the probable cause 
issue to the magistrate for decision. The person reading the statement to the 
magistrate shall verify to the magistrate that the person is reading the written 
statement verbatim, and shall write on the statement that person's name and 
title, the date and time of the communication with the magistrate, and the 
determination the magistrate directs to be indicated on the statement. 
(c)(2)(B) If a statement is verbally communicated by telephone, telefaxed, or 
otherwise electronically transmitted, the original statement shall, as soon as 
practicable, be filed with the court where the case will be filed. 
(c)(3) The magistrate shall review the probable cause statement and from it 
determine whether there is probable cause to continue to detain the arrestee. 
(c)(3)(A) If the magistrate finds there is not probable cause to continue to 
detain the arrestee, the magistrate shall order the immediate release of the 
arrestee. 
(c)(3)(B) If the magistrate finds probable cause to continue to detain the 
arrestee, the magistrate shall immediately make a bail determination. The bail 
determination shall coincide with the recommended bail amount in the Uni-
form Fine/Bail Schedule unless the magistrate finds substantial cause to deviate 
from the Schedule. 
(c)(4) The presiding district court judge shall, in consultation with the Justice 
Court Administrator, develop a rotation of magistrates which assures availabili-
ty of magistrates consistent with the need in that particular district. The 
schedule shall take into account the case load of each of the magistrates, their 
location and their willingness to serve. 
(c)(5) Nothing in this subsection (c) is intended to preclude the accomplish-
ment of other procedural processes at the time of the determination referred to 
in paragraph (c)(1) above. 
(d)(1) If a person is arrested in a county other than where the offense was 
committed the person arrested shall without unnecessary delay be returned to 
the county where the crime was committed and shall be taken before the 
proper magistrate under these rules. 
(d)(2) If for any reason the person arrested cannot be promptly returned to 
the county and the charge against the defendant is a misdemeanor for which a 
voluntary forfeiture of bail may be entered as a conviction under Subsection 
77-7-21(1), the person arrested may state in writing a desire to forfeit bail, 
waive trial in the district in which the information is pending, and consent to 
disposition of the case in the county in which the person was arrested, is held, 
or is present. 
(d)(3) Upon receipt of the defendant's statement, the clerk of the court in 
which the information is pending shall transmit the papers in the proceeding or 
copies of them to the clerk of the court for the county in which the defendant is 
arrested, held, or present. The prosecution shall continue in that county. 
(d)(4) Forfeited bail shall be returned to the jurisdiction that issued the 
warrant. 
(d)(5) If the defendant is charged with an offense other than a misdemeanor 
for which a voluntary forfeiture of bail may be entered as a conviction under 
Subsection 77-7-21(1), the defendant shall be taken without unnecessary delay 
before a magistrate within the county of arrest for the determination of bail 
under Section 77-20-1 and released on bail or held without bail under Section 
77-20-1 . 
(d)(6) Bail shall be returned to the magistrate having jurisdiction over the 
offense, with the record made of the proceedings before the magistrate. 
(e) The magistrate having jurisdiction over the offense charged shall, upon 
the defendant's first appearance, inform the defendant: 
(e)(1) of the charge in the information or indictment and furnish a copy; 
(e)(2) of any affidavit or recorded testimony given in support of the informa-
tion and how to obtain them; 
(e)(3) of the right to retain counsel or have counsel appointed by the court 
without expense if unable to obtain counsel; 
(e)(4) of rights concerning pretrial release, including bail; and 
(e)(5) that the defendant is not required to make any statement, and that the 
statements the defendant does make may be used against the defendant in a 
court of law. 
(f) The magistrate shall, after providing the information under paragraph (e) 
and before proceeding further, allow the defendant reasonable time and oppor-
tunity to consult counsel and shall allow the defendant to contact any attorney 
by any reasonable means, without delay and without fee. 
(g) If the charge against the defendant is a misdemeanor, the magistrate 
shall call upon the defendant to enter a plea. 
(g)(1) If the plea is guilty, the defendant shall be sentenced by the magistrate 
as provided by law. 
(g)(2) If the plea is not guilty, a trial date shall be set. The date may not be 
extended except for good cause shown. Trial shall be held under these rules 
and law applicable to criminal cases. 
(h)(1) If a defendant is charged with a felony, the defendant shall be advised 
of the right to a preliminary examination. If the defendant waives the right to 
a preliminary examination, and the prosecuting attorney consents, the magis-
trate shall order the defendant bound over to answer in the district court. 
(h)(2) If the defendant does not waive a preliminary examination, the magis-
trate shall schedule the preliminary examination. The examination shall be 
held within a reasonable time, but not later than ten days if the defendant is in 
custody for the offense charged and not later than 30 days if the defendant is 
not in custody. These time periods may be extended by the magistrate for good 
cause shown. A preliminary examination may not be held if the defendant is 
indicted. 
(i)(l) Unless otherwise provided, a preliminary examination shall be held 
under the rules and laws applicable to criminal cases tried before a court. The 
state has the burden of proof and shall proceed first with its case. At the 
conclusion of the state's case, the defendant may testify under oath, call 
witnesses, and present evidence. The defendant may also cross-examine ad-
verse witnesses. 
(i)(2) If from the evidence a magistrate finds probable cause to believe that 
the crime charged has been committed and that the defendant has committed 
it, the magistrate shall order that the defendant be bound over to answer in the 
district court. The findings of probable cause may be based on hearsay in 
whole or in part. Objections to evidence on the ground that it was acquired by 
unlawful means are not properly raised at the preliminary examination. 
(i)(3) If the magistrate does not find probable cause to believe that the crime 
charged has been committed or that the defendant committed it, the magistrate 
shall dismiss the information and discharge the defendant. The magistrate may 
enter findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an order of dismissal. The 
dismissal and discharge do not preclude the state from instituting a subsequent 
prosecution for the same offense. 
(j) At a preliminary examination, the magistrate, upon request of either 
party, may exclude witnesses from the courtroom and may require witnesses 
not to converse with each other until the preliminary examination is concluded. 
On the request of either party, the magistrate may order all spectators to be 
excluded from the courtroom. 
(k)(l) If the magistrate orders the defendant bound over to the district court, 
the magistrate shall execute in writing a bind-over order and shall transmit to 
the clerk of the district court all pleadings in and records made of the 
proceedings before the magistrate, including exhibits, recordings, and any 
typewritten transcript. 
(k)(2) When a magistrate commits a defendant to the custody of the sheriff, 
the magistrate shall execute the appropriate commitment order. 
(/ )(1) When a magistrate has good cause to believe that any material witness 
in a pending case will not appear and testify unless bond is required, the 
magistrate may fix a bond with or without sureties and in a sum considered 
adequate for the appearance of the witness. 
(/ )(2) If the witness fails or refuses to post the bond with the clerk of the 
court, the magistrate may commit the witness to jail until the witness complies 
or is otherwise legally discharged. 
(/ )(3) If the witness does provide bond when required, the witness may be 
examined and cross-examined before the magistrate in the presence of the 
defendant and the testimony shall be recorded. The witness shall then be 
discharged. 
(/)(4) If the witness is unavailable or fails to appear at any subsequent 
hearing or trial when ordered to do so, the recorded testimony may be used at 
the hearing or trial in lieu of the personal testimony of the witness. 
RULES OF EVIDENCE 
R U L E 1 1 0 2 . RELIABLE HEARSAY IN CRIMINAL PRELIMINARY EX-
AMINATIONS 
(a) Statement of the Rule. Reliable hearsay is admissible at criminal prelimi-
nary examinations. 
(b) Definition of Reliable Hearsay. For purposes of criminal preliminary 
examinations only, reliable hearsay includes: 
(1) hearsay evidence admissible at trial under the Utah Rules of Evidence; 
(2) hearsay evidence admissible at trial under Rule 804 of the Utah Rules 
of Evidence, regardless of the availability of the declarant at the preliminary 
examination; 
(3) evidence establishing the foundation for or the authenticity of any 
exhibit; 
(4) scientific, laboratory, or forensic reports and records; 
(5) medical and autopsy reports and records; 
(6) a statement of a non-testifying peace officer to a testifying peace officer; 
(7) a statement made by a child victim of physical abuse or a sexual offense 
which is promptly reported by the child victim and recorded in accordance 
with Rule 15.5 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; 
(8) a statement of a declarant that is written, recorded, or transcribed 
verbatim which is: 
(A) under oath or affirmation; or 
(B) pursuant to a notification to the declarant that a false statement 
made therein is punishable. 
(9) other hearsay evidence with similar indicia of reliability, regardless of 
admissibility at trial under Rules 803 and 804 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
(c) Continuance for Production of Additional Evidence. If hearsay evidence 
is proffered or admitted in the preliminary examination, a continuance of the 
hearing may be granted for the purpose of furnishing additional evidence if: 
(1) The magistrate finds that the hearsay evidence proffered or admitted is 
not sufficient and additional evidence is necessary for a bindover; or 
(2) The defense establishes that it would be so substantially and unfairly 
disadvantaged by the use of the hearsay evidence as to outweigh the interests 
of the declarant and the efficient administration of justice. 
[Adopted effective April 1, 1999.] 
Rule 1102 Advisory Committee Note cont. on next page 
Rule 1102 
Advisory Committee Note 
Rule 1102 applies only in criminal pre-
liminary examinations, and implements 
language added by amendment to Article 
I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution, ef-
fective July 1, 1995: 
Where the defendant is otherwise enti-
tled to a preliminary examination, the 
function of that examination is limited to 
determining whether probable cause exists 
unless otherwise provided by statute. 
Nothing in this constitution shall preclude 
the use of reliable hearsay evidence as 
defined by statute or rule in whole or in 
part at an}' preliminary examination to 
determine probable cause or at any pre-
trial proceeding with respect to release of 
the defendant if appropriate discovery is 
allowed as defined by statute or rule. 
Discovery is allowed under Rule 16, 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, as well 
as by case law and other statutes. 
Accordingly, paragraph (a) provides for 
admissibility of "reliable hearsay" evi-
dence in criminal preliminary examina-
tions (commonly called "preliminary hear-
ings ")• To the extent that State v. Anderson, 
612 P.2d 778 (Utah 1980), prohibited the 
use of hearsay evidence at preliminary ex-
aminations, that case has been abrogated. 
Paragraph (b) defines "reliable hearsay" 
in subparagraphs (1) through (8). Evi-
dence which is admissible under any other 
law or rule of evidence is not rendered 
inadmissible by anything in paragraph (b). 
Subparagraph (b)(2) specifically incor-
porates hearsay that would be admissible 
under U.R.E. 804 but eliminates the foun-
dational element of unavailability. 
Subparagraph (b)(3) permits the admis-
sion of exhibits in preliminary hearings 
even though the necessary foundation for 
admissibility is by hearsay only. For exam-
subparagraph (b)(9). If there is special rea-
son for exploring foundation or authentici-
ty, subparagraph (c) gives the magistrate 
power to require additional evidence after 
a continuance. 
Paragraph (c) provides for continuances 
in the preliminary examination to enable a 
party to provide live witnesses or a more 
reliable form of hearsay where a party is 
substantially disadvantaged by the admis-
sion or exclusion of hearsay evidence prof-
fered under this rule. 
Under subparagraph (c)(1), the prosecu-
tion can get a continuance where hearsay 
evidence is not admitted and would be 
necessary to get the case bound over. 
Under subparagraph (c)(2), a defendant 
may obtain a continuance by demonstrat-
ple, proving the chain of custody for con-
trolled substances may be accomplished 
under this section without calling the wit-
nesses in the chain. 
Subparagraphs (b)(4) and (b)(5) permit 
the specified types of reports and records 
to be admitted without the testimony of 
the person who prepared the report or 
record or the custodian of the record. If 
there is special reason for exploring foun-
dation or authenticity, subparagraph (c) 
gives the magistrate power to require addi-
tional evidence after a continuance. 
Subparagraph (b)(6) is similar to the 
"fellow officer" rule applicable to search 
or arrest warrant affidavits as providing 
sufficiently "reliable" evidence. 
Subparagraph (b)(7) requires that a 
child victim's hearsay report be close in 
time to the event reported and that it be 
recorded in compliance with the condi-
tions prescribed in Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure 15.5(l)(a) through (d). This sub-
paragraph does not necessitate a hearing 
under Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
15.5 (l)(e) through (h) as a prerequisite to 
admission at a preliminary examination. 
Under subparagraph (b)(8), written, re-
corded, or transcribed testimony of non-
testifying witnesses is admissible if it is 
sworn, affirmed, or given under notifica-
tion that false statements are prosecutable. 
The potential for prosecution under perju-
ry or other criminal provisions tends to 
ensure the reliability of such testimony. 
Subparagraph (b)(9) provides catchall 
admissibility for other forms of hearsay of 
similar reliability, not unlike U.R.E. Rules 
803(24) and 804(5) provide under existing 
hearsay exceptions. Unlike U.R.E. Rules 
803(24) and 804(5), there is no require-
ment that advance notice be given to the 
adverse party of evidence offered under 
ing that he is substantially and unfairly 
disadvantaged by a particular proffer of 
evidence that would be otherwise admissi-
ble under the rule and the disadvantage 
outweighs the interests of the witness and 
the efficient administration of justice. In 
making a decision as to whether the de-
fendant is substantially and unfairly disad-
vantaged by the use of reliable hearsay ev-
idence, a magistrate may, among other 
factors, take into consideration the limita-
tions on discovery available to the defen-
dant. 
Either party is at liberty to subpoena 
and call any live witnesses whose testimo-
ny would be germane to the determination 
of probable cause. 
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4TH DaSTftCT 
STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH CDUWTY 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COqjRT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
State of Utah, : 
Ruling 
Plaintiff : 
vs. : Date: October 9,2008 
Jesse Valdez, : Case Number: 081402004 
Defendant : Division VII: Judge James R. Taylor 
This matter comes before the Court on the State's motion for reconsideration of this 
Court's ruling that the State failed to meet its burden of proof at the preliminary hearing held 
August 28, 2008. 
The State relied upon a single witness at the preliminary hearing. Probation Officer Curt 
Robertson testified that he had received "numerous" calls from other law enforcement agencies 
complaining that Mr. Valdez was involved in selling narcotics. As the agent assigned to Mr. 
Valdez, Mr. Robertson went with several Provo police officers to the shed where Mr. Valdez 
lived at 1 a.m. on July 12, 2008. After several knocks Mr. Valdez came to the door and let 
Officer Robertson in. Mr. Valdez, himself, was searched and nothing was found. A couch was 
searched and nothing was found. Nothing was found during a quick search of the interior of the 
shed although the place was extremely cluttered with hundreds of nooks, crannies and 
automobile parts in which drugs could be hidden. Officer Robertson requested a canine search. 
Deputy Nielson, a K-9 officer for the Utah County Sheriffs Office arrived. Officer Robertson 
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was asked to take Mr. Valdez outside while the dog searched. Deputy Nielson came out and 
reported that the dog alerted on an area near the bed. 
Officers other than Officer Robertson searched while Robertson remained outside with 
Valdez. Nothing was found. The dog conducted another search and Deputy Nielson reported 
that the dog seemed to be interested in something "higher." Provo officers Barker and Watcott 
re-entered the shed and searched again. Officer Robertson did not observe the search. 
Officer Robertson testified that "officers," told him that Officer Watcott reached into a 
slit in an overhead tarp above the bed and retrieved a syringe and a baggie with a very slight bit 
of what appeared to be drug residue. He also understood that someone identified and 
disassembled an automobile carburetor next to the bed and found a baggie with a larger amount 
of crystal substance. The Court has re-listened to the testimony and cannot determine that 
Officer Robertson identified who told him that the carburetor had been searched or who did the 
searching of the carburetor. Officer Robertson testified quite specifically that he did not observe 
either physical search following the K-9 sweeps and had no personal knowledge about who 
located what or where the items were located. Both baggies were field tested and a positive 
result for methamphetamine was received. 
Rule 1102 allows the use of reliable hearsay at criminal preliminary hearings. Reliable 
hearsay is defined at 1102(b)(6) as "a statement of a non-testifying peace officer to a testifying 
peace officer." In this case, however, Officer Robertson didn't specifically recite any statements 
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of a non-testifying officer about the larger baggie found in the carburetor. While the testimony 
was specific about Officer Watcott reaching into the tear in the overhead tarp, the smaller baggie 
and syringe, by themselves, contained insufficient quantities to establish the felony charge. 
Officer Robertson was unable to state who searched the carburetor or who found the larger 
baggie of suspected drugs. The view of the Court at the time of the preliminary hearing, and 
now, is that this evidence was a step removed from hearsay and that the Court was asked to 
simply assume from the circumstances that some officer found the substance in a location that 
connected it to the Defendant. 
It has long been the tradition, in Utah Courts, to protect the basic right to confront 
witnesses at a preliminary hearing. In State v. Anderson, 612 P2d 778 at 786 (Utah, 1980) the 
Court noted: 
. . . the ancillary benefits inherent in this preliminary proceeding, 
e.g., the various aspects of discovery incident to the pretrial 
examination of prosecution witnesses, would be seriously curtailed 
by denying the defendant a right of confrontation at the hearing. 
This curtailment would infringe upon the defendant's right to a fair 
trial, by denying him the opportunity to prepare an effective defense. 
For example, the cross-examination of witnesses at this 
preliminary stage in a criminal prosecution provides the defendant 
an opportunity to attack their testimony before it becomes 
immutable by repetition and the influence, however legitimate, of 
the prosecution. Also, favorable testimony will often be elicited 
from the cross-examination of the witnesses at the preliminary 
examination and contradictory statements made at the hearing may 
subsequently become important as tools for attacking the 
credibility of the witnesses at the actual trial. 
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The specific prohibition from Anderson on the use of hearsay testimony at a preliminary 
hearing has been overturned by amendment to the Utah Constitution in 1996 (Article 1, Section 
12) and the adoption of Rule 1102, Utah Rules of Evidence in 1995. But the fundamental 
purpose of preliminary hearings remains unaltered. In this case the State asked the Court to rely 
not on a specific declaration of a non-testifying officer but upon the assumption of Officer 
Robertson that information he had obtained came from one of several officers who were there 
and found what was then field tested. This vague, unspecific presentation was not "reliable 
hearsay" and, without those inferences the testimony presented by the State was insufficient to 
meet the burden of proof required at a preliminary hearing. 
The Court respectfully declines to modify its previous ruling. 
A certificate of mailing is on the following page. 
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Case No. 081402004 
Judge James R. Taylor 
THE COURT, having heard the evidence at the preliminary hearing and considered the 
State's motion for reconsideration, hereby enters its FINAL ORDER dismissing all charges against 
the defendant in this matter. 
DATED this Q> day of J b W j ,2008. 
BY THE COURT: 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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Case No. 081402004 
PRELIMINARY HEARING 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 2 8th day of August, 
2008, the above-entitled matter came on for hearing before 
the HONORABLE JAMES TAYLOR, sitting as Judge in the above-
named Court for the purpose of this cause, and that the 
following proceedings were had. 
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THE COURT: I think in this circumstance, again, 
this is one where if you look and you're not sure who did 
the field sobriety, better get a chemical test done -- or --
or figure that out. Urn -- so anyway, the -- the burden is 
met in this case. Do you want to enter a plea today? 
MR. GALE: Urn -- judge, could we come back for an 
entry plea? 
THE COURT: Alright, well, let's move on to the 
other case. And then we will address both procedurally. 
(Inaudible) 
MS. THOMAS-FISHBURN: So they're both second 
degree felonies? 
THE COURT: It's -- it's possession of drugs and 
possession of paraphernalia we have opted to a second degree 
felony -- that's a misdemeanor. 
(Inaudible) 
MS. THOMAS-FISHBURN: Okay. State would call Kirt 
Robinson. 
THE COURT: Mr. Robinson, come be sworn. 
CLERK: Do you solemnly swear that the testimony 
you are about to give in the case pertaining before this 
court shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but 
the truth, so help you god? 
MR. ROBINSON: Yes I do. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Have a seat. 
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MS. THOMAS-FISHBURN 












on probation or parole 
Would you state your name 
Robinson, an agent for Adult 
And what are your duties in 
My duties are to 
in our 
supervise persons 
community for THE COURT: 
MS. THOMAS-FISHBURN: Are you a probation officer 
for Mr. Jesse Valdez? 
MR. ROBINSON: I am. 
MS. THOMAS-FISHBURN: Do you recognize him in the 
court today? 
MR. ROBINSON: Yes I do. 
MS. THOMAS-FISHBURN: And on July 12, 2 008, urn --
were you also his probation agent at that time? 
MR. ROBINSON: Yes I was. 
MS. THOMAS-FISHBURN: And -- and in the very early 
morning hours of that date, urn -- what were you doing? What 
were you involved with? 
MR. ROBINSON: Urn -- at approximately 1:00 in the 
morning, I conducted a field visit on Mr. Valdez's 
residence. Urn -- the reason for the field visit is I 
received numerous phone calls from various law enforcement 
agencies, either the Provo police department, or Utah County 
3 
major crimes task force indicating that Mr. Valdez was 
involved in the selling of methamphetamine. Urn -- they had 
received their information from various people they had 
taken into custody who had either -- what I understood from 
them -- purchased from Mr. Valdez or had seen Mr. Valdez 
selling methamphetamine. Urn -- I felt it necessary to act 
at that time and conducted a field visit. Therefore, it was 
very early in the morning. 
MS. THOMAS-FISHBURN: What happened when you 
conducted that field visit? 
MR. ROBINSON: Urn - - I - - sense a supervise people 
in -- in Provo, urn -- we are pretty close with CO. P., 
Officers, officer Barker and Officer Wolcott are both 
involved with the CO. P. program with the Provo police. I 
asked them to assist me. Urn -- it was kind of hard at 1:00 
AM to find other agents working. Urn -- we went over to Mr. 
Valdez's residence. I knocked on the door. Urn -- there was 
MS. THOMAS-FISHBURN: And by his residence, what 
are you referring to? 
MR. ROBINSON: A shed, actually, adjacent to his 
mother's mobile home at 435 north, 2045 west in Provo. 
MS. THOMAS-FISHBURN: Okay. And you knocked. 
MR. ROBINSON: I knocked. There was a pause. I 
knocked again. He eventually answered, approached the door. 
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He appeared a little disoriented. He 
up. He had been asleep. And at that 
assumed it to be true. Urn -- I asked 
Mr. Valdez said, "sure, come on in." 
entered the residence. Urn -- I asked 
what he had been doing for the night. 
been, "hanging out." 
said he had just woken i 
hour in the morning, I 
if I could come in. 
Me and Officer Barker 
Mr. Valdez basically 
He said he had just 
MS. THOMAS-FISHBURN: Was there anybody else in 
that residence? 
MR. ROBINSON: There wasn't 
Valdez. 
MS. THOMAS-FISHBURN: Okay. 
MR. ROBINSON: Urn -- I told 
It was just Mr. 
Mr. Valdez why I was 
there -- that I had received information that he had been 
involved in the selling of methamphetamine. Urn -- I asked 
if there was any in the residence or on him. He denied it. 
Urn -- I searched his person at that time and then searched a 
couch, which is inside the -- urn -- residents. I guess you 
would call it a residence -- and sat him down on the couch. 
After that occurred, I proceeded to search the rest of his 
living area. 
MS. THOMAS-FISHBURN: And in conducting the search 
of his person and the couch, did you locate anything? 
MR. ROBINSON: I did not. 
MS. THOMAS-FISHBURN: Okay. So you continued the 
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search. What did you find? 
MR. ROBINSON: Um -- at that point -- his -- his 
living quarters are extremely -- and when I say extremely --
I mean extremely cluttered. Um -- there are probably 
hundreds of small nooks and crannies, engine parts, um --
small containers, um -- I can't -- can't even go and -- and 
name all the places that are possible to hide small amounts 
of anything. Um --
MS. THOMAS-FISHBURN: So given those conditions, 
did you decide to do something further? 
MR. ROBINSON: I did. 
MS. THOMAS-FISHBURN: And what was --
MR. ROBINSON: I -- I requested a canine officer 
to have his canine come through and do a sweep of the area. 
MS. THOMAS-FISHBURN: Did that happen? 
MR. ROBINSON: It did. Deputy Nielsen with Utah 
County sheriff's office arrived with his canine and 
conducted a search with his dog. 
MS. THOMAS-FISHBURN: Are you familiar with canine 
searches yourself? 
MR. ROBINSON: I am. 
MS. THOMAS-FISHBURN: Why is that? 
MR. ROBINSON: I've used them in the past -- um --
multiple times to -- to help locate at least a general area 
where I can concentrate my search and find controlled 
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substances. 
MS. THOMAS-FISHBURN: So what was the result of 
this particular canine search? 
MR. ROBINSON: Urn -- I was not --at that time 
when the canine arrived, Deputy Nielsen asked that --
because it's such a small, cramped quarter, he asked that I 
remove Mr. Valdez from the area so his canine could do a 
proper search of the area. I did remove Mr. Valdez. We 
stood outside, in front of his -- his living area -- that 
is, in front of the shed. Urn -- the canine entered and did 
a preliminary sweep and Mr. Nielsen -- excuse me, Deputy 
Nielsen urn -- exited the area and actually indicated that 
the dog had indicated in the bed an area of the shed, urn --
another search was conducted in that bed area down low. And 
in some -- some surrounding compartments -- containers, 
nothing was found at that time. He brought the dog in 
again, the canine, for a secondary sweep. Again, indicating 
the same area, but this time it seemed to indicate -- and 
from what I was told by Deputy Nielsen -- upper -- the dog 
was sniffing towards the ceiling of the shed. Urn - - again, 
at that time, I was not present. Urn -- I was actually 
standing outside -- in the front of the shed, again, with 
Mr. Valdez. Urn --




























MR. ROBINSON: The secondary sweep, no. I did 
not. 
MS. THOMAS-FISHBURN: But the officers told you 
about it? 
MR. ROBINSON: Yes. Deputy Nielsen and Officer 
Barker. 
MS. THOMAS-FISHBURN: As a result of that 
secondary search by the canine, what did you then do? 
MR. ROBINSON: Um -- another -- another search was 
conducted in that area. Officer Barker and Officer Wolcott 
-- urn -- searched -- urn -- basically the top of the shed is 
covered in a tarp and all kinds of hanging material and 
small objects. Urn -- there was a slit visible m the tarp. 
Urn -- Officer Wolcott reached up through the slit and 
retrieved a syringe, a small baggie with crystalline residue 
m it, and digital scales. Urn -- there -- there was also an 
engine part, a carburetor actually laying right next to the 
bed. Urn -- the carburetor was taken apart, and inside, a 
piece of the carburetor was another baggie, a pink, reddish 
colored baggie. Urn -- it also had a crystalline substance 
m it. 
MS. THOMAS-FISHBURN: And m your experience, did 
you recognize that crystalline substance? 
MR. ROBINSON. It appeared to be methamphetamine. 
MS. THOMAS-FISHBURN: The plastic baggie that you 
found in the tarp, urn -- with residue -- how much residue? 
MR. ROBINSON: Urn -- very little, but enough to be 
recognized. 
MS. THOMAS-FISHBURN: Okay. And were those 
substances field tested? 
MR. ROBINSON: They were. 
MS. THOMAS-FISHBURN: What were the results of 
that? 
MR. ROBINSON: Urn -- both tested positive for 
methamphetamine. 
MS. THOMAS-FISHBURN: Okay. And what else was in 
the area -- what other buildings were within 1000 feet of 
this location? 
MR. ROBINSON: There was a church within 1000 feet 
of this residence. 
MS. THOMAS-FISHBURN: Okay. I have no further 
questions at this time. Thank you. 
MR. GALE: Urn - - agent Robinson, if I understand 
you right, urn -- you -- urn, you believed that Mr. Valdez had 
violated his probation because of information you got from 
different police agencies. Is that right? 
MR. ROBINSON: Mm-hmm. 
MR. GALE: So you went to his residence to talk 





ROBINSON: He did. 
GALE: Okay. Urn -






ROBINSON: I did not. 
GALE: Okay. Urn -• - yet 
submit to a search of that residence. 
MR. 
MR. 
and you didn' 
MR. 
MR. 




and you didn' 
MR. 
MR. 





GALE: And -- urn --
t find anything. 
ROBINSON: No. 






his shed --or 
i 
you asked him to 
searched the residence 
- at that point, you decided 
GALE: And you called the dog. 
on a couple of locations. 
t find anything. 
ROBINSON: Correct. 
GALE: Okay. Then you t 
The dog hit --
You searched again 
)rought 
And the dog again indicated on 
ROBINSON: Yes. 
GALE: Okay. And urn - -
was the officers -- Officer Barker and 
!that right? 
the dog in a 
several 
I think -- urn -- it 
L Officer Nielsen, is 
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MR. ROBINSON: Deputy Nielsen, yes. 
MR. GALE: Okay. Officer Barker and Deputy 
Nielsen who actually did the search, is that right? 
MR. ROBINSON: The second time, yes. 
MR. GALE: Okay. You weren't there? 
MR. ROBINSON: The secondary one, I was not. 
MR. GALE: Okay. This was actually the third 
search, is that right? 
MR. ROBINSON: Oh -- yeah. Third search 
conducted, second after canine indication. 
MR. GALE: Okay. Urn - - and you didn't ever think 
of going and getting a warrant after the first two searches 
or anything like that? 
MR. ROBINSON: I did not. 
MR. GALE: Okay. Urn - - and so -- urn -- you were 
outside and the officers actually did the search? 
MR. ROBINSON: I did remove Mr. Valdez. 
MR. GALE: Okay. Urn - - and so where -- where were 
you outside with him -- outside of the shed with him? 
MR. ROBINSON: And just standing right outside the 
entrance. 
MR. GALE: Okay. And the officers and the canine 
were inside. 
MR. ROBINSON: Yes. 
MR. GALE: Okay. Urn -- and so when you say, about 
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that -- 1 











ROBINSON: Yes it is. 
GALE: Okay. Urn 
anything was located"; 
MR. ROBINSON: Um --
--so you 
> 
that kind of stuff, 
is something that 
something you heard 
weren't the one who 
no, I'm not the one who 
removed the items from the location. 
question 




GALE: Okay. Um --
COURT: That wasn't the question. Ask the 
again. 
MR. GALE: You -- you were not 





GALE- Um -- you 








ROBINSON: I did 
GALE: You did --
ROBINSON: No, I 
didn't do 
the one who saw 
a field test? 
present while the field test 
not personally conduct it. 
you didn 
did not. 
t personally do a 
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test? 
MR. GALE: Okay. Who personally did do the field 
MR. ROBINSON: Officer Barker did. 
MR. GALE: Okay. Have you ever done a field test 
before? 
MR. ROBINSON: Yes I have. 
MR. GALE: Okay. Urn -- officer Barker did the 
field test? 
MR. ROBINSON: Yes he did. 
MR. GALE: And you saw it? 
MR. ROBINSON: Yes. I was standing right there. 
MR. GALE: Okay. And urn - - and that tested 
positive? 
MR. ROBINSON: Positive. 
MR. GALE: And it was for something that was --
got inside the carburetor. 
MR. ROBINSON: Correct. 
MR. GALE: Okay. You don't know where that 
carburetor -- you did not see where that carburetor was 
located? 
MR. ROBINSON: I --
MR. GALE: Where it was located? 
MR. ROBINSON: I -- I knew where the carburetor 
was located from my previous two searches. 
MR. GALE: Okay. 
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MR. ROBINSON: But I was not present when the 
methamphetamine was removed from the carburetor, no. 
MR. GALE: Okay. So you were told that the 









GALE: Urn - - I don't have anything further . 
THOMAS-FISHBURN: Did you observe the search 










ROBINSON: Urn -- the third -- where the --
THOMAS-FISHBURN: The search with --
ROBINSON: -the items were actually found? 
THOMAS-FISHBURN: Right. 
ROBINSON: No. I was not. I did not observe 
THOMAS-FISHBURN: Okay. The officers told you 






THOMAS-FISHBURN: At the time --
ROBINSON: Yes. 
THOMAS-FISHBURN: They -- did you see them 
after they were found? 




MS. THOMAS-FISHBURN: And was that still at the 
MR. ROBINSON: Yes. 
MS. THOMAS-FISHBURN: Okay. Thank you. Urn --
no further questions for this witness. 
MR. GALE: Nothing further at this time. 
THE COURT: Thank you. You can step down. 
MS. THOMAS-FISHBURN: No -- no further witnesses 
at this point. 
THE COURT: Mr. Gale? 
MR. GALE: Judge, we don't intend to present any 
evidence. Urn --
THE COURT: Do you want to be heard? 
MR. GALE: Urn -- I would like to be heard on the 
order. Urn -- judge, urn -- my argument is essentially the 
same thing that it was on the last case. Urn -- here we have 
an officer -- or a probation agent who was not actually 
present urn -- when the items were actually located in the 
shed. Urn -- I think its -- it's a fairly simple task to 
bring in the people that located the substance. Urn -- it's 
a little different from the last one because he was actually 
present when the field test was conducted. But we don't 
have the person here who actually conducted the field test. 
Urn -- I just think that at some point that we have to say 
this is not sufficient, we have to do more. And so I would 
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argue'against the sufficiency of the evidence for bind over 
on that basis. 
MS. THOMAS-FISHBURN: Urn -- this is an officer 
that was present at the time, was just outside the door, had 
seen the location, had seen everything that was involved in 
it, and was involved with running the whole search, and was 
advised by other officers what had been found in areas that 
he had seen himself as well. 
THE COURT: I'm troubled. Why -- Why haven't you 
brought in the officer who made the find? 
MS. THOMAS-FISHBURN: In the interest of judicial 
economy, judge, I wanted to have the officer who made the 
decisions about why and when to make this search. If the --
if it would please the court and Mr. Gale, I'm happy to move 
to continue the prelim and get those officers in. 
THE COURT: Anything further? 
MS. THOMAS-FISHBURN: Nothing further from the 
state. 
MR. GALE: Judge, I think today is the day set for 
preliminary hearing. Urn --
THE COURT: I'm not going to move the prelim. 
That was a bad choice, counsel. You know, probable cause 
can be established on hearsay. And I was stretching it at 
the last hearing. But this one -- all I've got is the 
officer's received report from someone who said that someone 
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was buying from the defendant. He went to the location, 
didn't find anything himself. He stepped outside, and then 
I have a report that an officer found some drugs. I don't 
have any direct testimony that the drugs were located. Urn -
- this one falls short. Urn -- I'm going to find that you 
failed to meet your burden of proof now. I understand the -
- the burden for re-filing. Mr. Gale does as well. Whether 
or not you legitimately or reasonably underestimated the 
proof that would be necessary for today is not before me. 
But you didn't meet your burden. So ten is dismissed. Case 
ending in 2004. Now, do you want to enter a plea in the 
case ending in 3429? 
MR. GALE: Judge, could we come back to enter a 
plea? 
THE COURT: Yes. We will catch -- set the case 
for entry of plea -- urn -- September -- when -- September 18 
at 1:30. 
MR. GALE: Okay. 
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